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 A major economic policy shift has occurred
worldwide since the 1970s and 1980s when,
under the tutelage of World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, most
developing countries moved to liberalize their
external current and capital accounts along
with domestic labor and financial markets.
They also privatized public enterprises, de-
emphasized industrial policy interventions,
and allowed a greater private sector role in
general. Fiscal austerity figured in many
programs sponsored by the Bretton Woods
Institutions.
At best, these policies had mixed results in
either reversing a slowdown in growth that
many countries encountered in the last
quarter of the 20th century (details below) or
in helping them break away from their poverty
and low level development traps (Taylor,
2001, 2006; Vos et.al. 2003). More than a
quarter of a century has passed since the first
versions of IMF and World Bank macro
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 reforms became the conventional wisdom.
Data are now available for a long enough time
to enable economists to sort the policy
implications out. 
This paper takes up the task, by examining
trends in macroeconomic indicators and
structural change that inform patterns of
development across countries over the last 20 or
30 years. The policy background is then brought
in (with emphasis on ideas – and propaganda
— emanating from the Bretton Woods
institutions). Suggestions are offered about other
approaches to policy that may help generate
more sustained and equitable development than
has been the case in the recent past.
We begin by investigating economic
evolution for the period 1970-2003, studying
several indicators to see how they relate to
changes (or lack thereof) in per capita GDP.
To keep the discussion within bounds, the
data are organized in terms of 12 regional
groups including 57 developing and transition
countries: rapidly growing East Asian
economies (or the “Tigers”), Southeast Asia,
China, South Asia, semi-industrialized “Latin
America” (including South Africa and Turkey
with economic structures similar to their
counterparts in the Western Hemisphere), the
Andean countries, Central America and the
Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Russia and
Ukraine representing the former USSR,
“representative” and “other” countries in sub-
Saharan Africa1,and the Middle East. Nations
in each group are listed in the Appendix.
To set the discussion, Figures 1 through 3
show levels of per capita GDP by region (log
scale) in terms of constant 1990 US dollars2 .
We identify three cohorts of regions and
countries that had similar patterns of growth:
There was sustained growth in the Tigers,
China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia
(dominated by India) as shown in Figure 1.
Relative to the other regions, South Asia had
less robust expansion and Southeast Asia did
not bounce back as strongly from the 1997
crisis as did the Tigers. 
Figure 2 illustrates late recovery (often not
very strong) in Eastern Europe, Russia/
Ukraine, semi-industrialized Latin America,
Central America and Caribbean, and
representative Africa.  Eastern Europe is in an
ambiguous situation. Over the period 1970-
2003 the region grew slightly faster in per
capita terms than South Asia (2.7% vs. 2.6%
per year) but because of the transition shock
around 1990 it seemed more appropriate to
call its case one of “late recovery.” 
Finally, the Andean group, Middle East,
and other Africa (dominated by Nigeria) were
basically stagnant throughout the period as
shown in Figure 3.
As discussed quickly below and in detail
in Rada and Taylor (2006) and United
Nations (2006) sustained growth in the
successful regions was associated with changes
in economic structure in several dimensions.
Output and labor share shifts, trade
diversification, sustained productivity growth
with (in some cases) strong reallocation effects
due to movements of labor from low to high
productivity sectors showed up strongly in
fast-growing economies. Aside from a shift of
employment toward service sectors, structural
change was only sporadic in the other regions. 
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1. The representative group is made up of four countries often discussed in the development literature, and the
others are included essentially on grounds of availability of data.
2. It is customary to make international income comparisons in terms of purchasing power parity (or PPP). How-
ever, as explained in Rada and Taylor (2006) PPP estimates distort the macroeconomic relationships that are at
the heart of our analysis. When it comes to policy formation, it is far more useful to think about macro rela-
tionships in traditional “real” terms.Structural change, economic policy, and development 53
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Any economy is a dynamic entity which
changes its structures and features as develop-
ment takes place. Indeed, a continuous
transformation of the economic structure is
key ingredient behind sustained growth and
development. This view is held by economists
trained in the structuralist macroeconomic
tradition. They hold that structural change is
the “ability of an economy to constantly
generate new dynamic activities” (Ocampo,
2005) characterized by higher productivity and
increasing returns to scale. In this regard getting
to know which structural changes are evident
for the regions that have recorded sustained
economic growth is key to understanding
future directions that other developing
economies are likely to take. Needless to say,
any economy is a unique entity which has its
own characteristics that require its own policies.
But stylized facts show that there are
identifiable macroeconomic directions that are
valid across different economic systems. 
To identify these macroeconomic direc-
tions we analyze structural shifts from several
angles. One is a decomposition of labor
productivity growth between agricultural,
industrial, and service sectors. Overall
productivity growth comes out as an average
of own-rates of growth (weighted by output
shares) for all sectors along with the
aforementioned “reallocation effects” which
are positive for sectors with relatively low
average productivity in which employment
54 Lance Taylor and Codrina Rada


















































Other Africa Middle East Andeanfalls or for high-productivity sectors in which
employment rises.3
A second exercise focuses on growth rates
of the economy-wide employment/
population ratio which is decomposed into
an average of growth rates of the ratio by
sectors weighted by employment shares. As it
turns out, the ratio of a sector’s own-
employment to total population will rise if
the growth rate of its output per capita exceeds
its growth rate of labor productivity.4 An
economy can be considered to be performing
well if it has both sustained productivity
growth and a rising employment/population
ratio overall. 
Finally, we look at net borrowing flows
(incomes minus expenditures) over time for
the government, private, and rest of the world
“institutional sectors” (normalized by GDP).5
As an accounting identity, borrowings must
sum to zero:
(Private investment – Saving) + (Public
spending – Taxes) + (Exports – Imports) = 0,
with a positive entry indicating that a sector is
a net contributor to effective demand. 
Output Growth
One notable finding is that sustained growth
among “successful” countries was accompa-
nied bystructural change, while countries that
did not enjoy per capita growth showed little
evolution. This aspect of the development
process has always been well known (to
structuralists at least) but ignored for the past
two or three decades despite its deep policy
implications. 
In one well-known aspect of sustained
development, the five rapidly growing regions
showed substantial shifts in sectoral output
shares, in the classic movement from primary
toward secondary and tertiary sectors. The
pattern stands out in Figures 4 through 6
which present scatter plots of per capita GDP
growth vs. percentage changes in sectoral
shares (again 1970-2003).
For the five regions with per capita output
growth exceeding 2%, Figure 4 shows a clear
inverse relationship between growth rates and
changes in the agricultural share. The lagging
seven regions basically generate a random
scatter. The rising agricultural shares in the
Andean and Middle Eastern regions are
anomalous as is the decrease accompanied by
negative growth in Russia/Ukraine.
Similar observations apply to the other
sectors – clear associations emerge for the
rapid growers and ill-defined data clouds for
the other regions. The growing regions had
rising industrial shares in Figure 5 (less so in
Eastern Europe which prior to 1970 had
already been pushed toward industrial
specialization).  Four slow growers suffered
long-term deindustrialization, while the
industrial sharein Russia and Ukraine did not
exhibit much dynamics. Following a long
period of industrialization and rapid output
growth the fast growers had increases in the
service sector share (to be expected) in Figure
6. There was no apparent relationship for the
others (except in Central American and the
Caribbean, possibly reflecting tourism).
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3. The approach follows Syrquin (1986).
4. The original insight is Pasinetti’s (1981).
5. The approach followed here is a variant on a demand decomposition proposed by Godley and Cripps (1983).56 Lance Taylor and Codrina Rada
Figure 4: Growth performance and structural change in agriculture
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Figure 5: Growth performance and structural change in industry
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Historically, labor productivity increases have
been the major contributing factor to gains in
real GDP per capita. At the same time, faster
productivity growth cuts into employment
growth unless it is offset by rising effective
demand. Details are investigated here and in
the following section. 
Figure 7 shows overall productivity growth
for the period 1991-2003/4. The rapidly
growing regions had productivity growth rates
exceeding (some greatly exceeding) the rich
country norm of 2% per year. The others fell
well short, and the former USSR had negative
productivity growth.
In terms of phasing over time, more
detailed results not presented here show that
Russia/Ukraine suffered an enormous
productivity collapse (-9.7% per year) in
1991-95, but then recovered to 5.6% (1999-
2003). Eastern Europe showed a similar
though far less violent pattern. The Tiger
region rapidly recovered its productivity
growth rate of 4-5% per year after the 1997
Asian crisis. Southeast Asia also had 4-5%
annual productivity growth prior to the 1997,
but rates tailed off thereafter. The other
regions had growth rate fluctuations over time
but no clear trends.
Figures 8-10 summarize direct and
reallocation contributions by sector to overall
productivity increases (as discussed above).
Comparing Figures 7 and 8 shows that
agriculture did not make a large contribution
to productivity growth overall. In several
regions the sector’s reallocation effects were
negative. The meaning is that there was
positive employment growth in agriculture
with its relatively low average productivity.
This finding is not surprising in China, South
Structural change, economic policy, and development 57
Figure 6: Growth performance and structural change in service sector
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Figure 7: Overall productivity growth
OverallLabour ProductivityGrowth:1991-2003/4
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Figure 8: Contribution of agriculture sector to productivity growth
AgricultureSector ContributiontoProductivityGrowth:1991-2003/4
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Reallocation gainAsia, and Africa, but is a bit discordant in the
Middle East with miniscule agricultural
sectors in the major oil producers.
The industrial sector’s own productivity
growth made a substantial contribution to the
total in four of the rapidly growing regions
(Figure 9) and there was a strong reallocation
contribution in Southeast Asia, the outlier. In
China the sector directly contributed almost
two-thirds of the overall productivity growth
rate of 9% shown in Figure 7. Industry made
a visible contribution in the two poorer
Western Hemisphere regions but detracted
from overall productivity performance in
Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East (the
latter gained from reallocation). 
Services in Figure 10 also added to total
productivity increase in the rapid growers (as
with industry, a negative direct but positive
reallocation contribution in Southeast Asia).
In other regions, the direct contribution from
services was typically negative with modest
positive contributions from reallocation. This
distinction among regions has implications
for job creation, as taken up below.
The bottom line on productivity growth
is that the two non-agricultural sectors made
solid contributions to the total in the fast-
growing regions, even as their overall
importance in the economy rose. Elsewhere
the results were a mixed bag, with no clear
patterns emerging. Insofar as it is measured
by average labor productivity growth,
technological advance was evident economy-
wide in the growing regions and absent or at
best sporadically present in other corners of
the world.
Structural change, economic policy, and development 59
IndustrialSector ContributiontoProductivityGrowth:1991-2003/4
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Figure 9: Contribution of industrial sector to productivity growthEmployment Growth Patterns
Figure 11 presents shifts in sectoral employ-
ment/population ratios in terms of their
contributions to changes in the ratio
economy-wide. Regional growth rates of the
overall ratio hovered around zero, with more
positive than negative values. As noted above,
at both the sectoral and national levels, the
ratio(s) will grow when the growth rate of
output per capita exceeds labor productivity
growth. The ratio(s) will also tend to rise when
population growth is negative, as was the case
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
The most striking feature in Figure 11 is
the apparent similarity of all 12 regions in the
sense that services showed a rising
employment/output ratio everywhere, rather
strongly except in Other Africa, the Middle
East, and (to an extent) South Asia. The
details, however, differed between fast- and
slow-growing regions. For the rapid growers,
the positive contribution of services to
employment growth shows that output per
capita grew faster than the sector’s rising
productivity that supported its positive
contributions to productivity growth overall
(darker bars) in Figure 10. Positive
reallocation gains were due to the fact that
services have relatively high average
productivity. In the slower growing regions,
direct contributions of services to economy-
wide productivity were weak but jobs were
still created because of rising demand.
Productivity did not increase rapidly within
the sector but the shifts in employment toward
60 Lance Taylor and Codrina Rada
Figure 10: Contribution of service sector to productivity growth
ServiceSectorContributiontoProductivityGrowth:1991-2003/4
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Real location gainit reflected in Figure 11 added to productivity
growth economy-wide.
Relative to population growth, agriculture
was a source of employable labor in nine
regions (very strongly in Southeast Asia) and
a sink only in (especially) the Andean region,
Other Africa, and the Middle East.  
Except in (especially) Southeast Asia, Latin
America, and Representative Africa, the
industrial sector was not a strong provider of
jobs. Consistent with Figures 9 and 11, its
rate of productivity growth tended to exceed
its growth in demand per capita. An old
observation in structuralist development
economics is that industry is the main motor
for productivity growth but not for job
creation.
Patterns of Net Borrowing
The next topic is net borrowing flows by
institutional sectors, which provide
information on overall demand and macro
cycles. Recall from section 1 that net
borrowing flows by the private, government,
and foreign sectors must sum to zero as a
condition for macroeconomic accounting
balance.
Figure 12 shows how they evolved for the
regions that had sustained growth after the
mid-1970s. The Tigers, China, and Southeast
Asia show opposing co-movements between
private and foreign net borrowing with
government borrowing maintaining a
relatively constant (Tigers), mildly fluctuating
(Southeast Asia), or slightly trended (China)
share of GDP. The private and foreign co-
Structural change, economic policy, and development 61
Figure 11: Sectoral contributions to employment
Sectoral Contribution to Employment: 1991-2003/4
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)movements were relatively large, with swings
up and down exceeding 10% of GDP in the
Tigers and Southeast Asia. Maintaining very
high per capita income growth over a 25-year
period with the macro economy subject to
such extreme fluctuations is a feat perhaps
unprecedented historically.  
In contrast, all three series in South Asia
remain nearly flat with a government deficit,
sustained private net lending (negative net
borrowing), and a balanced external account.
The private net lending share resembles
China’s, except that in South Asia the private
surplus financed a fiscal deficit while in China
the external account was in surplus. 
The other regions had more diverse
patterns (Figures 13 and 14). Several – Latin
America, Eastern Europe, Central America
and Caribbean, the Andes, and representative
Africa — seemed to have more or less
structural external deficits which did not
vanish over time (although magnitudes
fluctuated). A trade-off came up in that either
the government or the private sector (or both)
had to play the role of an internal borrower to
offset the external gap. The persistent gap
could have damaged growth performance
overall. It is extremely difficult to manage an
economy in which crucial imported capital
and intermediate goods may be cut off at any
time due to scarce foreign exchange.
InLatin America the government assumed
the borrowing role. There were offsetting
movements in the other regions with private
borrowing rising after government deficits
were cut back in austerity programs
(representative Africa, Central America and
the Caribbean, and the Andean economies
after the early 1980s; Eastern Europe after the
early 1990s) with subsequent switches the
other way in some cases.  
In Russia (like China a transition economy
with a historically high saving rate), a falling
government deficit offset the strong upward
swing in the external surplus after 1998. There
were similar, longer-lasting trends after the
mid-1970s in the Middle East, accompanied
by fluctuating private borrowing. Movements
in both private and government net
borrowing offset the shifting external balance
in other Africa. 
The standard “twin deficits” scenario
featuring mutually offsetting movements of
the external and fiscal deficits appears only
sporadically in the diagrams. In particular,
fiscal austerity seemed more associated with
rising private borrowing than falling external
deficits. A great deal of orthodox
macroeconomic stabilization theory —
notably the Polak (1957) model that for half-
a-century has been the bedrock of the
“financial programming” built into almost all
IMF packages – does not appear to be
consistent with the data. 
The implications for macroeconomic
causal relationships are worth considering.
For example, if there is a “binding” external
constraint that holds the trade deficit roughly
constant, then crowding-out of private
demand byhigher public demand is a familiar
story. One rationale is that if prices are not
stabilized by purchasing power parity then
they may begin to rise in response to higher
effective demand. Inflation tax and forced
saving mechanisms can kick in, reducing real
demand by the private sector (Taylor, 2004).
In Latin America, the Andean economies,
Central America and the Caribbean, Eastern
Europe, and representative Africa such
processes also appeared to work in reverse.
Austerity in the form of a reduced fiscal deficit
relaxed the squeeze on the private sector, and
its demand rose by enough to keep output
close to the limit imposed by a structural
external gap. If the external restriction is lifted
by an external bonanza, the results from the
Middle East and Russia suggest that
governments know how to reduce their net
Structural change, economic policy, and development 6364 Lance Taylor and Codrina Rada
Figure 13: Resource gap by institutional sectors in the late recovery regions
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extra resource rents.
Implications for Policy
As noted at the outset, there was major policy
shift that occurred worldwide since the 1970s
and 1980s – a move on the part of most
countries to deregulate or liberalize their
external current and capital accounts along
with domestic labor and financial markets.
Our empirical results help trace out its
implications. 
As Figures 1-3 illustrate, growth perfor-
mances deteriorated after 1980 in many parts
of the world. Clear success cases at the country
level – various Tigers, China, Vietnam in
Southeast Asia, and more recently India – are
scarcely paragons of neo-liberalism. Some
Eastern European policy-makers think of
themselves in that way but many vestiges of
the old order remain.
Moreover, the fact that structural change
in several dimensions – output and labor share
shifts, trade diversification, sustained
productivity growth with (in some cases)
strong reallocation effects – showed up
strongly in the fast-growing economies and
sporadically elsewhere may carry an implicit
message that intelligent sector-level policies
can facilitate the development process.
In macro terms, austerity was supposed to
lead to improvement in external balances
along IMF financial programming lines. That
clearly was not the common outcome. Even
falling government deficits and rising external
surpluses in the Middle East and Russia are
better explained from the external than
domestic side. More typical were co-
movements of private and foreign or (less
frequently) private and government
borrowing flows. These have to be examined
in terms of the specific macro behavior of each
economy concerned.
Macroeconomic flexibility, although
difficult to define and probably even harder
to attain, also appears to be important.
Witness the wide swings in net borrowing
flows between 1980 and 2000 in the Tigers
and Southeast Asia. Through it all, they
continued to grow. 
Stated goals of the liberalization package
were to enhance productivity and employ-
ment growth. Outside the consistently
expanding economies, this did not happen.
Productivity movements across sectors
differed in detail across slow-growing and
stagnant regions but did not add up to very
much. Employment/population ratios rose in
the Andean and Middle Eastern regions.6
Elsewhere, liberalization did not help create
jobs — industrial jobs in particular.
Privatization and financial deregulation
were followed by financial crises (sometimes
repeated) in many countries, associated with
vulnerability and under-regulation of the
financial sector, speculative behavior on both
sides of financial markets which led to
national balance sheets dangerously short on
foreign assets and long on domestic holdings
including real estate and equity (usually newly
created through privatization), and cycles of
real exchange rate appreciation. The crises
help explain the erratic performances in Latin
America, Eastern Europe, and Russia. As
noted above, Southeast Asia did not recover
as strongly as the Tigers from the 1997 crisis.
China and India to a large extent evaded its
impacts by maintaining capital controls. 
In sum, results across the regions differed.
Fast-growing regions were in many ways less
zealous about applying the liberalization
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6. A rise of the ratio in Russia/Ukraine can be discounted because of negative population growth.philosophy, and performed better. Elsewhere,
there was enough variety to suggest that specific
aspects of each region and its economies were
important in shaping outcomes. Structure
matters. The policy analysis challenge is to
figure out just how and why.  
Bretton Woods Justifications
Liberalization was heavily promoted by the
Bretton Woods Institutions under the famous
aegis of the “Washington Consensus.” It is
interesting to consider how the Institutions
themselves grapple with the apparent failure
of their recommendations.
One mode of discourse, especially
common on the part of the research depart-
ment of the World Bank, is to repeat policy
proposals even when they have been severely
criticized or discredited. Ozawa (2006) gives
ample detail. Here is a quick summary:
Agarwala (1983) proposed a “distortion
index” based on seven indicators which he
asserted had a negative relationship with
growth. The paper was greeted with fanfare in
that year’s World Development Report from the
Bank and the Economist magazine. Soon
thereafter, the results were refuted by
Aghazadeh and Evans (1985) who expanded
on Agarwala’s econometrics to conclude that 
We tested a Non-Structuralist, Struc-
turalist, Animal Spirits and Export-led
growth story for consistency with the data.
We found that the data were most
consistent with the Structuralist and
Animal Spirit stories, and that in both cases
there was some evidence that national
development strategies relying on a
strongly interventionist state backed by
high military expenditure worked best.
The Agarwala paper vanished from discus-
sion. Yet by the time the 1991 World
Development Report rolled around the Bank
was again claiming that reducing distortions
would enhance productivity growth, with
equally flimsy econometric support as pointed
out by Fanelli, Frenkel, and Taylor (1992).
With regard to the WDR’s reported linkages
between productivity growth and absence of
market distortions or economic openness,
they observe that 
Of 37 reported regression coefficients, five
have the “wrong” sign (i.e. greater
distortion is associated with faster growth)
and only 13 of the 32 other relationships
are significant at the 5 percent level. One
learns … that R2 values in partial
correlations between lower distortions and
growth (after taking into account the
effects of human and physical capital and
other variables) range from 0.03 to 0.3.
With such weak relationships many
economies in the WDR’s samples are bound
to have behaved the “wrong” way [emphasis
added]. 
This statement reflects the now widely
accepted view that cross-country regressions
are essentially useless when it comes to
explaining economic growth.
The Bank’s 1991 econometric exercises
also vanished, perhaps because by 1993 the
well-known  East Asian Miracle report
emphasized “market friendliness” as the key
to the region’s success, a claim that met with
resounding criticism soon after. And Dollar
(2004) touted the post-1980 period as one of
success for developing countries in general
under globalization, in flat contradiction to
Figures 1-3 above.7
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7. Weisbrot et. al. (2001) give an incisive critique of an earlier version by Dollar and Kray (2001).In another area, World Bank computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models always
give estimates in the high range of “welfare
gains” from trade liberalization. Unfor-
tunately, as argued in detail by Taylor and
Arnim (2006), in their technical details the
models are fundamentally flawed.  They rely
on “little triangle” welfare indicators which
many sensible people repudiate, and then
apply them incorrectly! The standard
calculations are based on movements of prices
and quantities along stable demand and
supply curves. But in the Bank’s CGE models
the specification of price formation under
international trade interacts with the fiscal
balance in such a way as to shift the level of
effective demand. Cutting tariffs (or reducing
trade subsidies) paradoxically reduces (or
increases) real aggregate consumption,
meaning that all sectoral level welfare
calculations are subject to biases of unknown
magnitude and direction. 
Finally, one new strand in development
thinking is related to liberalization’s motley
and often unfavorable outcomes. It is the
study of “governance” or how “institutions”
condition the development process. In recent
World Development Reports, this line of
thought seems to boil down to Blame the
Victim. If Washington Consensus policies
don’t deliver favorable outcomes in some
developing or transition country, the blame
doesn’t rest with the policies themselves but
with the country’s own inadequate institu-
tions. It should remake its institutions along
neo-liberal lines, a strikingly ahistorical
assertion if there ever was one. Currently rich
countries did not have strongly liberal
institutions, as scholars from Polanyi (1944)
to Chang (2002) have pointed out.
How Should Policies Change?
Other ideas are much more worth developing.
We can begin with notions relevant to the
growth process as such:
One important point, strongly enunciated
by Nayyar (2005), is that policy makers in
developing countries have had their hands tied
by the liberalization process – in the areas of
macroeconomics and industrial policy among
others. 
An idea tracing back to Adam Smith and
recently restated by Reinert (2006) and
formalized by Rada (2006) is that the
economy can usefully be viewed as a
combination of dynamic increasing returns
sectors and more plodding constant or
decreasing returns activities. The goal is to
stimulate the former while shifting resources
(especially labor) from the latter. Figures 4-11
illustrate how the rapidly growing regions
succeeded at this task. The question is how to
design policies that will facilitate similar
processes elsewhere.
Indeed, charting institutional changes that
could open up degrees of freedom for the
pursuit of developmentalist policies looks like
a more fruitful approach than abstractly
theorizing about institutions and trying to
quantify their impacts along purely
neoclassical lines. Some examples:
Does the open economy “trilemma” really
bind? That is, can independent monetary/
fiscal policies, exchange rate programming,
and open capital markets all be combined? In
the land of textbooks it is straightforward to
show that they can be, or in other words that
the Mundell-Fleming “duality” between a
floating exchange rate and control of the
money supply does not exist. A central bank
in principle has enough tools at its disposal to
control monetary aggregates regardless of the
forces determining the exchange rate.8
In practice, however, arbitrary changes in
monetary and exchange rate policies may be
68 Lance Taylor and Codrina Radaattacked by markets. Along Nayyar’s lines, the
question then becomes one of how other
policies may be deployed widen boundaries
on feasible maneuvers.  Frenkel and Taylor
(2006) argue that under appropriate
circumstances a weak exchange rate can be
desirable for developmentalist reasons. The
“circumstances” include a productive sector
which is responsive to price signals, a
monetary authority willing and able to
maintain a weak rate for an extended period
of time (perhaps supported by capital market
and other interventions), and political
willingness to bear the (conceivably high)
initial costs of devaluation including potential
inflation and output contraction. Getting
away from the recent obsession with using the
exchange rate for “inflation targeting” could
be a useful step toward making it a more
developmentally useful policy tool.
In the area of industrial/commercial
policy, the impact of the WTO has been to
rule out interventions involving tariffs and
trade while up to a point different forms of
subsidies (witness Airbus vs. Boeing!) are still
considered kosher. How can developing and
transition economies operate effectively in this
new environment? The Smithian prescription
to stimulate increasing returns sectors did not
cease to apply when the WTO was born. The
question is how to implement it under present
circumstances.
At the macro level, a question implicit in
Figure 11 is also relevant: how can economies
avoid the “jobless growth” that has been
characteristic of the liberalization period?
Evidently, productivity growth must be
positive for per capita incomes to rise but
demand growth must be stronger for
employment to be created in support of a
socially sustainable growth process. It remains
to be seen in many countries whether they
will be able to program rapid growth in
demand under a regime of liberalized
international capital markets.
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8. For the gory textbook details see Chapter 10 in Taylor (2004). Frenkel and Taylor (2006) present a more insti-
tutionally nuanced discussion. Appendix: Countries in the Regional Groups
1. Representative Africa: Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania
2. Other Africa: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zimbabwe
3. Central America and the Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Jamaica
4. Andean Region: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru
5. Semi-Industrialized Latin America (with Turkey and South Africa as additions): Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Turkey, South Africa
6. South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
7. China
8. Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
9. Tigers: Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
10.Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Yemen
11.Former USSR: Russian Federation, Ukraine
12.Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
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